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LABOR LAW- LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT - STRIKE DURING
LIFE OF CONTRACT UNDER A REOPENING PROVISION -A collective bargaining agreement between Lion Oil Company and the union provided that if
either party should desire to amend, notice should be served on the other,
but not before August 24, 1951. The contract could be terminated by
giving sixty days notice to terminate if agreement could not be reached
within the sixty days following notice to amend. The contract did not
contain a no-strike clause. The union gave notice on August 24, 1951 of
its desire to amend, and having reached no agreement, struck on April 30,
1952 without having served notice to terminate. Both parties agreed that
the contract remained in force at this time. The Labor-Management Relations Act prohibits a strike after notice to terminate or modify "for a
period of sixty days . . . or until the expiration date of such contract,
whichever occurs later."1 An NLRB order held that the strike was permissible.2 This order was set aside by the court of appeals.s On certiorari

161 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (d)(4).
2109 N.L.R.B. 680 (1954).
3 Lion Oil Co. v. NLRB, (8th Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d) 231.
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to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed.4 The term "expiration date" as used in section 8 (d) (4) includes the earliest date during the
life of the contract when modification may take effect, and since the union
gave proper notice and did not strike within sixty days or before the date
when modification could be effective, it was not guilty of an unfair labor
practice. NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (1957).
The question raised by the principal case affects millions of workers
employed under fixed term collective bargaining agreements to which
Taft-Hartley applies: aside from the terms of the contract, can strike for
economic purposes during its life be lawful? 5 Viewed in terms of its effect
on the right to strike, the decision is probably not very important, since
the right could still be protected, even under the view taken by the court
of appeals, by making the contract more easily terminable. 6 A far more
significant effect, however, may be anticipated in the decision's influence
on negotiations for long term contracts, a matter of particular importance
to the larger industrial concerns.7 If the act prohibits all strikes for economic purposes during the life of the contract, then shorter term, or more
readily terminable, contracts should be expected in the future. The act
presents no problem where the contract does not contain an expiration
date. Section 8 (d) (1) simply requires that notice be given sixty days before
the desired modification or termination is to take effect, and section 8 (d) (4)
continues the contract in effect for sixty days. If the contract contains an
expiration date, however, then in order to effectuate a termination or
modification, section 8 (d) (1) requires notice sixty days before the expira. tion date and section 8 (d) (4) forbids a strike for sixty days or until the
expiration date, whichever occurs later.s Read literally, the act seems to
preclude the right to strike at any time during the life of a fixed term
contract,9 while a strike would be permissible if there were no expiration
4 Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred in the holding, b11t dissented as to the
Court's determination of the related contract issue.
5 The unfair labor practice question presents a problem in applying the act, independent of the breach of contract question. A strike may be unlawful under the act,
though expressly allowed by the contract. Matter of United Packinghouse Workers of
America, CIO, and Wilson, 89 N.L.R.B. 310 (1950). As to whether a breach of contract,
per se, constitutes an unfair labor practice, see generally, comment, I SYRACUSE L. REv.
67 (1949); S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 15, 18, 28 and part 2, p. 12 (1947).
6 E.g., the 1954 contract between B. F. Goodrich and the Rubber Workers (CIO) provides that notice to reopen on wages may be given at any time and if agreement is not
reached in 60 days, the contract automatically terminates. See BNA, LABOR RELATIONS
REPORTER, Vol. 36, No. 1, (May 1955).
7 BNA, LABOR RELATIONS REPORTER, Vol. 36, No. I, (May 1955).
8 61 Stat. 142-143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (d) (I), (4): " . . . no party . . . shall
terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification-(!) serves ... notice ... of the proposed termination or modification sixty days
prior to the expiration date thereof, or . . . [if no expiration date] sixty days prior to the
time it is proposed to make such termination or modification; . . . (4) continues in .•.
effect, without •.. strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract
for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such
contract, whichever occurs later."
9 S. Rep. 986, part 3, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 62 (1947).
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date. The Eighth Circuit took the position that this language makes any
strike before the expiration date unlawfu1,10 and that expiration means
termination of the contract.U That court reasoned that the statutory language is unambiguous, and if the result is undesirable, it is the responsibility of Congress to change the law.12 The members of the NLRB, however, have placed various interpretations ori subsection 8 (d) (4) to avoid
this strict result. The Board first took the view that section 8 (d) was
designed to prevent "quickie" strikes, and that Congress did not show an
intent to outlaw strikes over the much longer periods that would be
covered by a literal application of section 8 (d).13 The majority then
held that this purpose would be best effected by interpreting section 8 (d)
to allow a strike at any time during the life of the contract on sixty days
notice, even if served before the contract permitted reopening. Member
Peterson sought to reconcile this interpretation with the language of section 8 (d) (4) by arguing that the phrase "whichever occurs later" was
meant only to cover the situation where notice is served less than sixty
days before the termination of the contract.14 Member Murdock argued
that all the provisions of section 8 (d) were meant to apply only around
the end of a contract of fixed duration, and were not meant to regulate
changes in the contract during its term, basing his argument on the frequent references in section 8 (d) to expiration and termination of the contract.11> The views of Members Peterson and Murdock probably reflect
the thinking of Congress when section 8 (d) was enacted, but this simply
indicates that Congress was not then cognizant of the problem raised by
the principal case.16 If this is true, then the languge of section 8 (d) alone
is an unsatisfactory guide to congressional intent when applied to the
question in the principal case. In contrast to the Act of 1935,17 the policy
of the 1947 amendment is to confer rights and impose obligations both on
10 Local No. 3, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO v. NLRB, (8th Cir.
1954) 210 F. (2d) 325.
11 Lion Oil Co. v. NLRB, note 3 supra.
12 But cf. NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., (2d Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 462; NLRB v.
Wagner Iron Works, (7th Cir. 1955) 220 F. (2d) 126.
13 Matter of United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO, and Wilson, note 5 supra.
But cf. S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 24 (1947).
14 Lion Oil Company, note 2 supra.
lli See separate opinions of Members Herzog and Murdock in Matter of United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO, and Wilson, note 5 supra; and Murdock's dissent in
Lion Oil Company, note 2 supra. But see Frankfurter's concurring opinion in the prin- cipal case.
16 Senator Taft's statement, 93 CoNG. R.Ec. 3839 (1947), with its oft-quoted phrase,
"If such notice is given, the bill provides for no waiting period except during the life
of the contract itself," is illustrative. Cf. Murdock's dissent in Lion Oil Co., note 2 supra,
and Local No. 3, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO v. NLRB, note IO supra,
where the quoted phrase was used to reach an opposite conclusion. Frankfurter's analysis
(principal case at 299) seems more appropriate: " ..• Senator Taft's attention was directed
solely to strikes at termination.•.." For further indications of congressisonal purpose, see
also, Senator Ball's speech, 93 CONG. R.Ec. 5014 (1947); S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess.,
p. 24 (1947).
17 49 Stat. 449.
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labor and on management.IS Any construction of this act, therefore, which
severely restricts the rights of one party should not be favored. The Supreme Court has recognized that the act is intended to promote collective bargaining, but also to protect the right of employees to enforce their
demands by concerted action. .The Court previously, in another context,
rejected a literal reading of section 8 (d) for these policy reasons.1 9 Specific
provisions of the act in the;! light of these general policies support the
Court's conclusion in the principal case as probably the best compromise
between a literal reading of the act and its policy objectives. Legislative
history indicates that Congress was unaware of the problem of contract
reopenings when the act was passed, but it was soon recognized,20 and
both the committee's interpretation of the act as its stands21 and subsequently proposed amendments2 2 support the Court's interpretation. The
ultimate effect of the decision should be to foster more stable industrial
relations by permitting the use of long term contracts without the loss of
the right to strike.
Dudley Chapman

1s 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §151.
19 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). See 55 MICH. L. REv. 296 (1956).
20 S. Rep. 986, part 3, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 62 (1947).
21"The right of the union [to reopen] would be an empty one.without the right to
strike after a 60-day notice." S. Rep. 986, part 3, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 62 (1947). This
suggests a further question, not decided by the principal case, i.e., whether a strike after
60 days' notice and during the life of the contract, but in the absence of, or not conforming to, a reopening provision, is an unfair labor practice. The Board's original interpretation would allow a strike on 60 days' notice regardless of the provisions of the contract,
so far as the act is concerned, but the majority of the Board in the principal case confined
the protection of the act to those cases where notice is in conformity with a reopening
provision. The majority of the Board in the principal case laid particular emphasis on
policy arguments in favor of enforcing the contract, which suggests the problem in note
5 supra. The Supreme Court did not discuss the problem, as it was not presented, but
Frankfurter did and concluded that the strike must conform to the reopening provision.
22 Senator Taft's amendment proposed in 1949, S. Rep. No. 99, part 2, 81st Cong., 1st
sess., p. 42 (minority report).

